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Abstract In the classic Bertrand duopoly, a firm need only undercut its competitor by
an arbitrarily small amount in order to sell to all the consumers. This paper generalises
the Bertrand model so that a firm must be more than ε cheaper than its competitor in
order to take the market. I characterise the unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilib-
rium. Firms earn strictly positive expected profits in equilibrium which are increasing
in ε. The model is also a special case of the price-setting stage of the Hotelling model
with a non-uniform distribution of consumers. The model can also be formulated as
one of sequential search without replacement from a discrete distribution of prices.
Keywords Bertrand model · Discontinuous payoffs · Duopoly · Hotelling model ·
Price dispersion
JEL Classification L13 · D21 · D43
1 Introduction
In the classic Bertrand duopoly, firms split the market equally if and only if they offer
exactly the same price. If one firm offers a price arbitrarily less than its competitor, it
is able to sell to all of the consumers. This leads to fierce competition and marginal
cost pricing in equilibrium. That firms make no profit in equilibrium is called the
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Bertrand paradox: it seems strange that the model only requires one additional firm
in the marketplace to go from the monopoly outcome to an outcome which simulates
perfect competition. In this paper I provide a natural extension of the Bertrand model
where firms split the market equally if their prices are sufficiently close to one another;
there is a unique symmetric equilibrium where firms earn positive expected profits.
There are a number of papers which consider circumstances under which the
Bertrand paradox disappears and firms earn positive profits in equilibrium. Baye and
Morgan (1999) show that if the monopoly profit function is unbounded there exist pos-
itive profit equilibria. Dastidar (1995) shows that if firms have identical and strictly
convex cost functions, positive profit equilibria exist even when the monopoly profit
function is bounded. Baye and Morgan (2002) show that this result no longer holds
under the ‘winner-takes-all’ tie-breaking rule. Baye and Kovenock (2008) show that
with concave costs and a symmetric sharing rule, equilibria may not exist in either
pure or mixed strategies. In my model, the monopoly profit function is bounded, firms
have identical and constant marginal costs and the results are invariant to the choice
of sharing rule. The only departure from the classic model is that the firms now tie if
their prices are sufficiently close.
Another classicmodel of competition is due toHotelling (1929)wherefirms initially
choose their location and then compete on price. The equilibrium price distributions
in my model are precisely the mixed strategies which would be chosen by firms in
the price-setting stage of the Hotelling model for a restricted class of (non-uniform)
distributions of consumers.1
Finally, my model has an extremely simple sequential search interpretation where
two firms simultaneously choose a price. These two prices {p1, p2} form a known
discrete distribution from which consumers can take costly draws without replace-
ment. In this respect, my model is closest to Stiglitz (1987) who models sequential
search (both with andwithout replacement) from a known discrete distribution by con-
sumers who differ in their search costs. However, he does not characterise the actual
pricing strategies that firms use in equilibrium. Stahl (1989) does derive the equilib-
rium distribution of prices; however, in his model consumers do not know the realised
distribution of prices, they only know the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium.2
Furthermore, his model requires some consumers to have no search costs; otherwise,
the equilibrium involves only monopoly pricing.
Ever since Diamond (1971) showed that even small search costs can lead to
monopoly pricing, one of the key issues the literature has struggled with is explaining
how price dispersion for homogeneous goods can be an equilibrium phenomenon.
This is important since without price dispersion there is no need for consumers to
search. A nice feature of Stahl’s (1989) model is that as search costs increase, the dis-
1 There is a literature which deals with non-uniform distributions of consumers in the Hotelling model;
see Anderson et al. (1997), Neven (1986), Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) and Shilony (1981).
2 Stahl (1996) stresses the distinction betweenmodels in which “consumers know the ‘market distribution’
of actual prices being charged but do not know which store is charging which price” and those models
where consumers search optimally with respect to the mixed strategies firms use in equilibrium but without
knowledge of the realisations (unless they search). My model is of the first type, others of this type include
Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Braverman (1980), Rob (1985) and Stiglitz (1987). Models of the second type
include Burdett and Judd (1983), Axell (1977) and Stahl (1989).
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tribution of prices smoothly increases from competitive to monopoly pricing—thus
providing a bridge between the Bertrand paradox (zero profits) and the Diamond para-
dox (monopoly pricing). There is a similar effect in my model. Finally, in the unique
equilibrium of mymodel, firms usemixed strategies, thus this extremely simple model
is able to explain price dispersionwithout having to assume any heterogeneity of firms,
consumers or goods.3
2 The model
There are two firms (i = 1, 2) competing for a unit mass of consumers who demand
one unit of a good which they value at v = 1. Firms simultaneously choose a price.
If the two prices are within ε of each other, the firms split the market equally. If the
two prices are greater than ε apart, all the consumers purchase from the cheapest
firm. Firms can produce the good costlessly. The firms have continuous action space
Ai = [0, 1] and their profit function is given by:
πi (pi , p j ) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
pi , pi < p j − ε
pi
2 , |pi − p j | ≤ ε
0, pi > p j + ε.
This fully specifies the game. We give three interpretations which give rise to the
game: (1) the Bertrand interpretation (2) the Hotelling interpretation and (3) the search
interpretation.
1. The Bertrand interpretation
Primarily, the model is a generalisation of the Bertrand model. In my model a firm
must be sufficiently cheaper in order to attract all of the consumers. One reason
for this might be that there is a small amount of heterogeneity in the goods being
sold; half of the consumers have a preference for firm 1 while the other consumers
have a preference for firm 2. Thus, in order to tempt consumers away from their
competitor, a firm has to be at least ε cheaper. Notice that the model with ε = 0
collapses to Bertrand competition.
2. The Hotelling interpretation
In the standard Hotelling model, consumers are distributed uniformly. My model
is a special case of the price-setting stage of the Hotelling model but with a non-
uniform distribution of consumers. Letting xi be firm i’s location on the unit
interval (w.l.o.g. x1 ≤ x2). Suppose that transportation costs are linear (so that in
order to travel from a to b it costs |a − b|) and the ‘market is covered’ so that all
consumers value the good sufficiently highly to make a purchase in equilibrium.
In this case, any distribution of consumers where half the consumers are located
somewhere in the interval [0, x1] and the other half are located somewhere in the
3 Baye et al. (2007) provide an excellent review of models which attempt to explain price dispersion.
Typical examples include Varian (1980): in his model it is necessary for some proportion of consumers to
either not be optimising or have search costs which are so large that search is never optimal. Other papers
introduce heterogeneity in firms’ costs (e.g. Reinganum 1979) or consumers’ search costs (e.g. Rob 1985).
In Burdett and Judd (1983) consumers are able to search multiple firms in parallel.
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interval [x2, 1] gives rise to my model. The ‘ε’ in my model is then the distance
between the two firms x2 − x1.
If transportation costs are non-linear then the case where half the mass of con-
sumers is located at x1 and the other half are located at x2 also gives rise to my
model. Here, any increasing transportation cost function will do: what is important
is that consumers agree on how preferable it is to purchase from the closer of the
two firms.
3. The Search interpretation
The model can also be formulated as a simple sequential search model without
replacement from a known discrete distribution of prices. Consider the following
timing:
1. The two firms simultaneously choose a price each.4
2. Consumers know which two prices {p1, p2} have been chosen, but they do not
know which price is associated with which firm.
3. Consumers can search without replacement from the known distribution {p1, p2}
which contains only two discrete prices.
4. The first search is ‘free’ and at random: half of the consumers draw p1 and the
other half draw p2.
5. Consumers can purchase immediately at the price they have drawn or they can pay
ε in order to take another draw (i.e. visit the other firm whose price is known and
will be drawn for sure).
It is straightforward to see that if the two firms’ prices are within ε of one another, they
split the market; while if one is more than ε cheaper it sells to all of the consumers.
2.1 Solving the model
Here, I prove the substantive result, which is that there is a unique symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium where firms offer prices according to the distribution
F(pi ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 − (1+
√
2)ε
pi +ε , pi ∈
[√
2ε, (1 + √2)ε
]
;
2 − (1+
√
2)ε
pi −ε , pi ∈
[
(1 + √2)ε, (2 + √2)ε
]
.
I begin by using dominance arguments in order to simplify the problem.
Lemma 1 Prices in the interval [0,√2ε) do not survive the iterated deletion of prices
which are strictly dominated.
Proof If firm i offers a price of ε and firm j offers a price p j , profits to firm i will be
πi (ε, p j ) =
{
ε
2 , p j ∈ [0, 2ε] ;
ε, p j > 2ε.
By offering the price ε, firm i can guarantee itself at least a payoff of ε/2. Thus, offering
a price less than ε/2 must be strictly dominated by offering the price ε. Now consider
4 Firms are allowed to randomise, but a single price must be chosen by each firm here.
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Fig. 1 Partitioning the action space into regions
firm i offering the price 3ε/2, depending on p j , this will yield profits
πi (3ε/2, p j ) =
{
3ε
4 , p j ∈
[
ε
2 ,
5ε
2
]
;
3ε
2 , p j >
5ε
2 .
Since no firm will offer a price less than ε/2, firm i can guarantee itself a payoff of
at least 3ε/4. This allows us to delete prices less than 3ε/4. Iterating in this fashion
allows us to delete all prices less than ε. We can in fact delete more prices than this.
Consider the pure strategy si which plays pi ≥ ε for sure, and the alternative strategy
s′i which involves playing pi + ε with probability σ and pi + 2ε ≤ 1 with probability
1 − σ (Fig. 1).
Consider profits to firm i—when playing the two different strategies—when firm
j prices in the different regions:
Region A: Since we are searching for the limit of iteratively deleting dominated strate-
gies, we need not consider firm j pricing in this interval since it would have been
deleted in some earlier round.
Region B: πi (si , B) = 12 pi , πi (s′i , B) = σ2 (pi + ε).
In order for strategy s′i to strictly dominate strategy si , it must be that
πi (s
′
i , B) > πi (si , B) ⇔ σ >
pi
pi + ε . (1)
Region C: πi (si , C) = pi , πi (s′i , C) = 12 [σ(pi + ε) + (1 − σ)(pi + 2ε)].
In order for strategy s′i to strictly dominate strategy si , it must be that
πi (s
′
i , C) > πi (si , C) ⇔
1
2
[σ(pi + ε) + (1 − σ)(pi + 2ε)] > pi . (2)
Call pˆ the lowest price which cannot be shown to be strictly dominated using this
argument. If this is the case, pˆ will (just) fail to satisfy the conditions (1) and (2), so
that
σ = pˆ
pˆ + ε and
1
2
[
σ( pˆ + ε) + (1 − σ)( pˆ + 2ε)] = pˆ.
Solving for pˆ give us that pˆ = √2ε.
Region D: πi (si , D) = pi , πi (s′i , D) = σ(pi + ε) + 1−σ2 (pi + 2ε).
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Fig. 2 Partitioning the action space into regions
In order for strategy s′i to strictly dominate strategy si , it must be that
πi (s
′
i , D) > πi (si , D) ⇔ σ(pi + ε) +
1 − σ
2
(pi + 2ε) > pi . (3)
This condition will always be satisfied if (2) is satisfied.
Region E: Here both strategies attract all the consumers, meaning that s′i must do
strictly better than si since it is associated with strictly higher prices. unionsq
Lemma 2 Prices in the interval (4ε, 1] do not survive the iterated deletion of prices
which are strictly dominated.
Proof Now consider which prices we can iteratively delete from the top of the interval
[0, 1]. Again si is a pure strategy which plays pi for sure, while s′i this time, plays
pi − 2ε for sure (Fig. 2).
Consider profits to firm i—when playing the two different strategies—when firm
j prices in the different regions:
RegionA: Prices in this regionwill have been deleted in some earlier round of deletion.
Region B: πi (si , B) = 12 pi , πi (s′i , B) = pi − 2ε.
In order for strategy s′i to strictly dominate strategy si , it must be that
πi (s
′
i , B) > πi (si , B) ⇔ pi > 4ε. (4)
Region C and D: πi (si , C) = πi (si , D) = 0, πi (s′i , C) = πi (s′i , D) = 12 (pi − 2ε).
If condition (4) holds, strategy s′i does strictly better than strategy si here.
Region E: πi (si , E) = πi (s′i , E) = 0.
Here, s′i does not do strictly better than si . However, we will still be okay if we
amend strategy s′i (call it s′′i ) so that instead of offering the price pi − 2ε for sure, it
offers it with probability 1 – μ. Where μ is some small strictly positive real number.
With the remainingμ probability, strategy s′′i is equally likely to offer one of the prices
pi − 4ε, pi − 6ε, pi − 8ε and so on. This will mean that πi (s′′i , E) > 0. Furthermore,
strategy s′′i does almost aswell as strategy s′i in the other regions. Formally, for any pi >
4ε, one can always find a μ > 0 sufficiently small such that πi (s′′i , B) > πi (si , B). In
the other regions, it is easy to see that πi (s′′i ) > πi (si ) for sufficiently small μ. unionsq
We know that any candidate for an equilibriummust only offer prices in the interval
[
√
2ε, 4ε] with positive probability. We now argue that there can be no mass points in
the equilibrium strategy.
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Lemma 3 There can be no mass points in the equilibrium strategy.
Proof Suppose that there was a mass point in the equilibrium strategy of firm i at price
p. Firm j reasons that there will be a discontinuous fall in its profit at p + ε. This is
because at a price of p + ε firm j will ‘draw’ with the mass (i.e. they will split the
market equally), but at a price above p + ε, firm j will ‘lose’ against the mass. Thus,
for firm j , playing the price p + ε dominates the prices in some interval (p + ε, q].
Firm j also notices that there is a discontinuous rise in profit at a price less than p – ε
which causes some interval [p – ε, r ] to be dominated. This means that firm j will not
play in either of these intervals if there is a mass at p. Firm i now notices that there
exists some price greater than p which attracts the same proportion of consumers as
p, thus there can be no mass at p. unionsq
Since there are no mass points, it follows that a symmetric equilibrium, if it exists,
must involve firms offering prices in a single continuous interval or a number of con-
tinuous intervals. We will prove that it cannot be that there are a number of continuous
intervals, there must be only one. First we will need another lemma.
Lemma 4 The support of the symmetric equilibrium distribution of prices F can
be partitioned into pairs of intervals which are ε apart. Furthermore, if the pair
([a, b], [a + ε, b + ε]) is in the support then it cannot be that prices in the interval
[a − ε, b − ε] or the interval [a + 2ε, b + 2ε] are in the support of F.
Proof The proof is in two parts.
1. If the interval [x , y] is in the support of F it must be that we can partition it so that
for every partitioned subinterval [a, b] there is at least one corresponding interval
[a – ε, b – ε] and/or [a + ε, b + ε] which is also in the support of F .
2. It cannot be that all three intervals ([a – ε, b – ε], [a, b], [a + ε, b + ε]) are played
in equilibrium.
1. In equilibrium, profits in the interval [a, b] must be constant, thus a firm must
be indifferent between charging a price p ∈ (a, b] and a price slightly below p,
say p′ ∈ [a, b). In order to compensate the firm for the lower price, at the price
p′ it must be that they (in expectation) attract some additional consumers. This
is only possible when their opponent offers prices in the interval [p′ – ε, p – ε]
and/or the interval [p′ + ε, p + ε].
2. Suppose that all three intervals are played in equilibrium. Suppose firm j ran-
domises according to F . If firm i chooses a price pi ∈ [a −ε, b−ε] this will yield
an expected profit of:
E [πi (pi , F)] =
[
1 − 1
2
F(pi + ε)
]
pi .
From Lemmas 1 and 2 we know that at these prices, firm i will sell to either, half
of the consumers or all of the consumers, i.e. it is not possible for firm j to offer
a price less than b – 2ε and sell to the entire market as this would mean that the
range of prices being offered would be at least 3ε. Since E [πi (pi , F)] must be
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constant for all prices in the support, we can let E [πi (pi , F)] = π and rearrange
the above to get
F(pi + ε) = 2
[
1 − π
pi
]
, pi ∈ [a − ε, b − ε].
This tells us about the behaviour of F for prices in the interval [a, b]. Yielding
F(pi ) = 2
[
1 − π
pi − ε
]
, pi ∈ [a, b].
Similarly, if firm i chooses a price pi ∈ [a + ε, b + ε] this will yield an expected
profit of
E [πi (pi , F)] = 1
2
(1 − F(pi − ε))pi .
Again, setting E [πi (pi , F)] = π and rearranging we have
F(pi − ε) = 1 − 2π
pi
, pi ∈ [a + ε, b + ε].
This tells us about the behaviour of F for prices in the interval [a, b]. Yielding
F(pi ) = 1 − 2π
pi + ε , pi ∈ [a, b].
We now have two expressions that F must satisfy in order to qualify as a candidate
for an equilibrium. We need that they are consistent with one another, which
requires
2
[
1 − π
pi − ε
]
= 1 − 2π
pi + ε , pi ∈ [a, b]
⇒ pi =
[
4πε + ε2
] 1
2
pi ∈ [a, b] .
This cannot be true for any range of prices since this tells us that pi is equal to a
constant. unionsq
We can now describe the exact interval of prices which must be played in any
symmetric equilibrium.
Lemma 5 The support of the symmetric equilibrium distribution—if it exists—must
be one continuous interval
[√
2ε, (2 + √2)ε
]
.
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Proof We know from Lemma 4 that intervals of prices must occur in pairs in the
equilibrium price distribution.5 Consider a distribution F , which consists only of
playing the distinct intervals [a0, b0], [a1, b1], . . . , [an, bn], [a0+ε, b0+ε], . . . , [an+
ε, bn + ε]. We can show that in order for this to be a candidate for a symmetric
equilibrium it must be that there are no gaps in between these intervals. From the
proof of Lemma 4 we know that for each pair, the ‘lower’ interval, i.e. the intervals
[a0, b0], [a1, b1], . . . , [an, bn] must have CDF
F(pi ) = 1 − 2π
pi + ε .
While the ‘upper’ interval, i.e. the intervals [a0 + ε, b0 + ε], . . . , [an + ε, bn + ε]
must have CDF
F(pi ) = 2
[
1 − π
pi − ε
]
.
Since our distribution is atomless it must be that F(a0) = 0 ⇒ π = 12 (a0 + ε) and
also F(bn + ε) = 1 ⇒ π = bn2 . Equating these two expressions for profits tells us
1
2
(a + ε) = bn
2
⇒ bn = a0 + ε.
So, if the smallest price being played is a0, the largest prices being played must
be a0 + 2ε. Again using the fact that the distribution is atomless it must be that
F(bk) = F(ak+1); k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. Which, in conjunction with our knowledge
of the CDF, implies that bk = ak+1; k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. This tells us that there will
be no gaps in the distribution between [a0, bn].
Inspecting the upper intervals we see that it must be that F(bk + ε) =
F(ak+1 + ε); k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. Which implies that bk + ε = ak+1 + ε; k =
0, 1, . . . , n − 1. This tells us that there will be no gaps in the distribution between
[a0 + ε, bn + ε]. Finally, we need to check that these two intervals join together
continuously at a0 + ε. That is, we need
1 − 2π
pi + ε
∣
∣
∣
∣
pi =a0+ε
= 2
[
1 − π
pi − ε
]∣
∣
∣
∣
pi =a0+ε
.
Using π = 12 (a0 + ε) and evaluating give us
ε
a0 + 2ε =
a0 − ε
a0
⇒ a0 =
√
2ε.
unionsq
We can now state and prove the substantive result.
5 A pair being two intervals [x, y] and [x + ε, y + ε].
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Result There is a unique symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where both firms
offer prices according to:6
F(pi ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 − (1+
√
2)ε
pi +ε , pi ∈
[√
2ε, (1 + √2)ε
]
;
2 − (1+
√
2)ε
pi −ε , pi ∈
[
(1 + √2)ε, (2 + √2)ε
]
.
Expected profits to each firm are π = 12 (1 +
√
2)ε.
Proof We know from Lemma 5 that our candidate for a symmetric equilibrium must
satisfy
F(pi ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 − 2πpi +ε , pi ∈
[√
2ε, (1 + √2)ε
]
;
2 − 2πpi −ε , pi ∈
[
(1 + √2)ε, (2 + √2)ε
]
.
Since the support is of 2ε length, offering the price exactly in the centre of the
support will guarantee that a firm receives exactly half of the consumers. This tells us
that expected profit must be π = 12 (1 +
√
2)ε, plugging this into F yields our result.
Finally, we need to check that a firm cannot do better by pricing outside of the
interval when its opponent is offering prices according to F . We need to check two
possible intervals of prices: (1) [(2 + √2)ε, (3 + √2)ε] and (2) [(−1 + √2)ε,√2ε].
This is because at prices greater than (3 + √2)ε firms will attract no customers and
a price of (−1 + √2)ε is sufficiently low to attract all consumers. Pricing in interval
(1) yields
E [πi (pi , F)] = [1 − F(pi − ε)] pi
2
⇒ π ′i (pi ) =
(1 + √2)ε
pi − 2ε
[
1 − pi
pi − 2ε
]
− 1 < 0.
Thus pi = (2 +
√
2)ε must do strictly better than all other prices in this interval.
Pricing in interval (2) yields
E [πi (pi , F)] =
[
1 − 1
2
F(pi + ε)
]
pi
⇒ π ′i (pi ) =
1
2
+ (1 +
√
2)ε
2(pi + 2ε)
[
1 − pi
pi + 2ε
]
> 0.
Thus pi =
√
2ε must do strictly better than all other prices in this interval. unionsq
6 To ensure existence we need that ε is not too large compared to consumers’ valuations, in particular
ε ≤ 1/(2 + √2). This ensures that prices offered are contained within the interval [0, 1].
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3 Concluding remarks
The simple model in this paper makes a contribution to the literature in three areas of
economic theory: Bertrand competition, the Hotelling model and search theory.
Given the canonical status of the Bertrand model it is surprising that (to my knowl-
edge) no paper has attempted to extend the model in the direction presented here. We
are essentially answering the question: what happens when there exists some kind of
friction in the marketplace which means that consumers only switch between firms if
prices are sufficiently different? We have remained agnostic regarding the source of
this friction but it could include switching costs, product differentiation, search costs,
transportation costs or some other kind of consumer inertia.
The model generalises the Bertrand model of price competition and in doing so
moves away from the Bertrand paradox of competitive pricing and zero profits in
equilibrium. At the same time, for small frictions, prices in equilibrium are close to the
competitive benchmark. As frictions increase, prices become, on average, both higher
and more dispersed. For sufficiently large frictions, monopoly pricing results.7 That
is, the model provides a bridge between competitive pricing (the Bertrand paradox)
and monopoly pricing (the Diamond paradox). The model also provides an analytical
solution to the equilibrium pricing strategies firms use in the price-setting stage of the
Hotelling model with arbitrary locations, albeit with (very) restricted distributions of
consumers.
Finally, as a model of sequential search, the model is limited by only being able
to solve for the two-firm case. Nevertheless, the model can explain price dispersion
in a simple optimising model without having to assume any heterogeneity of con-
sumers, firms or goods. As far as I am aware, there is no other paper where consumers
search sequentially for a single good where this is the case. A natural extension would
be to solve the model with N firms where consumers search sequentially without
replacement from N discrete prices.8
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